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1 PROBLEM DEFINITION
An instance I of the Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) [5, 6, 14] involves a set R =
fr1; : : : ; rng of residents and a set H = fh1; : : : ; hmg of hospitals. Each hospital hj 2 H
has a positive integral capacity, denoted by cj . Also, each resident ri 2 R has a preference
list in which he ranks in strict order a subset of H. A pair (ri; hj) 2 R H is said to be
acceptable if hj appears in ri's preference list; in this case ri is said to nd hj acceptable.
Similarly each hospital hj 2 H has a preference list in which it ranks in strict order those
residents who nd hj acceptable. Given any three agents x; y; z 2 R [ H, x is said to
prefer y to z if x nds each of y and z acceptable, and y precedes z on x's preference list.
Let C =
∑
hj∈H
cj .
Let A denote the set of acceptable pairs in I, and let L = jAj. An assignment M
is a subset of A. If (ri; hj) 2 M , ri is said to be assigned to hj , and hj is assigned ri.
For each q 2 R [ H, the set of assignees of q in M is denoted by M(q). If ri 2 R and
M(ri) = ;, ri is said to be unassigned, otherwise ri is assigned. Similarly, any hospital
hj 2 H is under-subscribed, full or over-subscribed according as jM(hj)j is less than, equal
to, or greater than cj , respectively.
A matching M is an assignment such that jM(ri)j  1 for each ri 2 R and jM(hj)j  cj
for each hj 2 H (i.e., no resident is assigned to an unacceptable hospital, each resident
is assigned to at most one hospital, and no hospital is over-subscribed). For notational
convenience, given a matching M and a resident ri 2 R such that M(ri) 6= ;, where there
is no ambiguity the notation M(ri) is also used to refer to the single member of M(ri).
A pair (ri; hj) 2 AnM blocks a matching M , or is a blocking pair for M , if the following
conditions are satised relative to M :
1. ri is unassigned or prefers hj to M(ri);
2. hj is under-subscribed or prefers ri to at least one member of M(hj) (or both).
A matching M is said to be stable if it admits no blocking pair. Given an instance I of
HR, the problem is to nd a stable matching in I.
2 KEY RESULTS
HR was rst dened by Gale and Shapley [5] under the name \College Admissions Prob-
lem". In their seminal paper, the authors' primary consideration is the classical Stable
1
M := ∅;
while (some resident ri is unassigned and ri has a non-empty list) {
hj := first hospital on ri’s list;
/* ri applies to hj */
M := M ∪ {(ri, hj)};
if (hj is over-subscribed) {
rk := worst resident in M(hj) according to hj ’s list;
M := M\{(rk, hj)};
}
if (hj is full) {
rk := worst resident in M(hj) according to hj ’s list;
for (each successor rl of rk on hj ’s list)
delete the pair (rl, hj);
}
}
Figure 1: Gale/Shapley algorithm for HR.
Marriage problem (SM; see Entries 142 and 143), which is a special case of HR in which
n = m, A = R  H, and cj = 1 for all hj 2 H { in this case, the residents and hospitals
are more commonly referred to as the men and women respectively. Gale and Shapley
show that every instance I of HR admits at least one stable matching. Their proof of this
result is constructive, i.e., an algorithm for nding a stable matching in I is described.
This algorithm has become known as the Gale/Shapley algorithm.
An extended version of the Gale/Shapley algorithm for HR is shown in Figure 1.
The algorithm involves a sequence of apply and delete operations. At each iteration of the
while loop, some unassigned resident ri with a non-empty preference list applies to the rst
hospital hj on his list, and becomes provisionally assigned to hj (this assignment could
subsequently be broken). If hj becomes over-subscribed as a result of this assignment,
then hj rejects its worst assigned resident rk. Next, if hj is full (irrespective of whether hj
was over-subscribed earlier in the same loop iteration), then for each resident rl that hj
nds less desirable than its worst resident rk, the algorithm deletes the pair (rl; hj), which
comprises deleting hj from rl's preference list and vice versa.
Given that the above algorithm involves residents applying to hospitals, it has become
known as the Resident-oriented Gale/Shapley algorithm, or RGS algorithm for short [6,
Section 1.6.3]. The RGS algorithm terminates with a stable matching, given an instance
of HR [5] [6, Theorem 1.6.2]. Using a suitable choice of data structures (extending those
described in [6, Section 1.2.3]), the RGS algorithm can be implemented to run in O(L)
time. This algorithm produces the stable matching that is simultaneously best-possible
for all residents [5] [6, Theorem 1.6.2]. These observations may be summarised as follows:
Theorem 2.1. Given an instance of HR, the RGS algorithm constructs, in O(L) time,
the unique stable matching in which each assigned resident obtains the best hospital that
he could obtain in any stable matching, whilst each unassigned resident is unassigned in
every stable matching.
A counterpart of the RGS algorithm, known as the Hospital-oriented Gale/Shapley
algorithm, or HGS algorithm for short [6, Section 1.6.2], gives the unique stable matching
that similarly satises an optimality property for the hospitals [6, Theorem 1.6.1].
Although there may be many stable matchings for a given instance I of HR, some key
structural properties hold regarding unassigned residents and under-subscribed hospitals
with respect to all stable matchings in I, as follows.
Theorem 2.2. For a given instance of HR,
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 the same residents are assigned in all stable matchings;
 each hospital is assigned the same number of residents in all stable matchings;
 any hospital that is under-subscribed in one stable matching is assigned exactly the
same set of residents in all stable matchings.
These results are collectively known as the \Rural Hospitals Theorem" (see [6, Section
1.6.4] for further details). Furthermore, the set of stable matchings in I forms a distributive
lattice under a natural dominance relation [6, Section 1.6.5].
3 APPLICATIONS
Practical applications of HR are widespread, most notably arising in the context of cen-
tralised automated matching schemes that assign applicants to posts (for example medical
students to hospitals, school-leavers to universities, and primary school pupils to secondary
schools). Perhaps the largest and best-known example of such a scheme is the National
Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the US [16], which annually assigns around 31,000
graduating medical students (known as residents) to their rst hospital posts, taking into
account the preferences of residents over hospitals and vice versa, and the hospital capac-
ities. Counterparts of the NRMP are in existence in other countries, including Canada
[17], Scotland [18] and Japan [19]. These matching schemes essentially employ extensions
of the RGS algorithm for HR.
Centralised matching schemes based largely on HR also occur in other practical con-
texts, such as school placement in New York [1], university faculty recruitment in France
[3] and university admission in Spain [12].
Extensions of HR. One key extension of HR that has considerable practical importance
arises when an instance may involve a set of couples, each of which submits a joint pref-
erence list over pairs of hospitals (typically in order that the members of a given couple
can be located geographically close to one another, for example). The extension of HR in
which couples may be involved is denoted by HRC; the stability denition in HRC is a
natural extension of that in HR (see [6, Section 1.6.6] for a formal denition of HRC). It
is known that an instance of HRC need not admit a stable matching (see [6, Section 1.6.6]
and [14, Section 5.4.3]). Moreover, the problem of deciding whether an HRC instance
admits a stable matching is NP-complete [13].
HR may be regarded as a many-one generalisation of SM. A further generalisation of
SM is to a many-many stable matching problem, in which both residents and hospitals
may be multiply assigned subject to capacity constraints. In this case, residents and
hospitals are more commonly referred to as workers and rms respectively. There are
two basic variations of the many-many stable matching problem according to whether (i)
workers rank acceptable rms in order of preference and vice versa, or (ii) workers rank
acceptable subsets of rms in order of preference and vice versa. Previous work relating
to both models is surveyed in [4].
Other variants of HR may be obtained if preference lists include ties. This extension
is again important from a practical perspective, since it may be unrealistic to expect a
popular hospital to rank a large number of applicants in strict order, particularly if it is
indierent among groups of applicants. The extension of HR in which preference lists may
include ties is denoted by HRT. In this context three natural stability denitions arise,
so-called weak stability, strong stability and super-stability (see [8] for formal denitions of
these concepts). Given an instance I of HRT, it is known that weakly stable matchings
may have dierent sizes, and the problem of nding a maximum cardinality weakly stable
3
matching is NP-hard (see Entry 151 for further details). On the other hand, in contrast
to the case for weak stability, a super-stable matching in I need not exist, though there is
an O(L) algorithm to nd a such a matching if one does [7]. Analogous results hold in the
case of strong stability { in this case an O(L2) algorithm [8] was improved by an O(CL)
algorithm [10] and extended to the many-many case [11]. Furthermore, counterparts of
the Rural Hospitals Theorem hold for HRT under each of the super-stability and strong
stability criteria [7, 15].
A further generalisation of HR arises when each hospital may be split into several
departments, where each department has a capacity, and residents rank individual depart-
ments in order of preference. This variant is modelled by the Student-Project Allocation
problem [2]. Finally, the Stable Fixtures problem [9] is a non-bipartite extension of HR in
which there is a single set of agents, each of whom has a capacity and ranks a subset of
the others in order of preference.
4 OPEN PROBLEMS
Several approximation algorithms for nding a maximum cardinality weakly stable match-
ing have been formulated, given an instance of HRT where each hospital has capacity 1
(see Entry 151 for further details). It remains open to extend these algorithms or to for-
mulate eective heuristics for the case of HRT with arbitrary capacities. This problem
is particularly relevant from the practical perspective, since as already noted in Section
3, hospitals may wish to include ties in their preference lists. In this case weak stability
is the most commonly-used stability criterion, due to the guaranteed existence of such a
matching. Attempting to match as many residents as possible motivates the search for
large weakly stable matchings.
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
None is reported.
6 DATA SETS
None is reported.
7 URL to CODE
Ada implementations of the RGS and HGS algorithms for HR may be found via the
following URL: http://www.dcs.gla.ac.uk/research/algorithms/stable.
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